We investigate the effects of forward looking behavior in technology adoption. The setup is an overlapping generation model where agents choose between two alternative networks taking in consideration both the installed base and the expected base. The latter element is the distinctive feature of our approach. We use results from the global games literature to select the unique equilibrium on which agents coordinate their expectations. We consider both the cases of incompatible and compatible technologies, and show that technologies cannot lock-in, while the adoption path exhibits hysteresis. Network choices are characterized both in terms of their long run properties and expected time of adoption.
Introduction
In this paper we investigate the effect of forward-looking behavior in technology adoption. We analyze technologies exhibiting network externalities, in that they become more valuable for each individual the more consumers adopt them. The literature has treated the problem of both static and dynamic decision-making in the presence of network externalities. However, the possibility for agents to consider the behavior of their future counterparts -obviously ruled out within a static setup -, has not received much attention within dynamic frameworks. In fact, most of the papers assume that agents realize their payoffs at the time they purchase a given technology. From then on they belong to the network, thus increasing the future adopters' benefits but not receiving any further payoff. As a consequence agents regard predecessors' adoptions only, that is they consider the installed base when opting for one technology. We believe nevertheless that it is reasonable to assume that agents receive payoff in all periods of their permanence in the network. In this case expectations over future agents' choices need to be factored in.
Arthur [2] presents a dynamic model in which agents choose between two competing technologies based on their personal preferences (so-called stand alone value) as well as the network benefit, with the latter described by a function of the total number of previous adopters. The main finding of his work is that whenever a given technology achieves a sufficient mass of adopters, it locks in attracting all future consumers. As a result inferior technologies might dominate the market due to initial adopters' choices. David [8] argues that this is the case for the QWERTY standard for keyboards, given that alternative and more efficient systems such as the DSK were patented since the beginning of the twentieth century. Arthur [2] considers as well the possibility that consumers take into account the future base. However he restricts his analysis to the case of lock-in by one of the technologies, neglecting in the first place how forward-looking behavior interplays with the existence of lock-in. Our objective is to fill in this gap allowing agents to obtain payoffs every period of their lives and to form expectations about the future base. A similar standpoint is taken in Ochs and Park [23] , that highlight the importance of forward looking behavior in network formation. 1 Attraction initiated by the Belgian State, Prime Minister's Office, Science Policy Programming. The scientific responsibility is assumed by the authors. 1 Their model differs from ours in that individual types (or technology values as in our setup) are uncorrelated. This disables the use of the global games equilibrium selection approach, which is central to our results. In Ochs and Park [23] it is possible to identify a
We choose an overlapping generations model for two reasons. Firstly OLG models are appropriate to study the choice of buying a durable good and holding it for several periods. Further OLG models allow agents to form expectations over their finite lifetime. Shy [25] considers an OLG setup as well, but like Arthur [2] the future behavior of agents is not regarded as a determinant of consumers' choices. Lock-in is still possible in Shy [25] . This is driven by the population growth and technology improvements, and would occur when technologies are not perfectly compatible and individuals consider technology quality and network size as complements. However, in other cases such as perfect substitutability, technologies might not lock in.
As soon as agents have to form expectations over future agent's behavior, a technical problem arises: multiplicity of equilibria. If individuals expect the adoption of a certain technology, they have an incentive to choose this same technology. As Levin [17] points out, 'because the expectation of a certain behavior tends to be self-fulfilling, there is the strong possibility of multiple expectations-driven equilibria' (Levin [17] , p. 1).
The main problem is therefore to select among these equilibria the one that will actually be played. The literature on equilibrium selection has recently developed tools to predict the outcome of our technology adoption game. In their seminal paper, Carlsson and van Damme [5] propose an approach to equilibrium selection through so-called global games. A global game is 'an incomplete information model (...) which is based on a perturbation of the player's payoff information' (Carlsson and van Damme [5] , p.1). The main result is that if 1) each player observes a noisy signal of the payoffs and 2) the payoffs space includes values that make each action strictly dominant, then iterative dominance leads to a unique equilibrium as the noise becomes small. Morris and Shin [22] provide a general overview of the main results in the global games literature 2 . Applying the results in Levin [17] to our dynamic technology adoption game we are able to isolate the unique equilibrium. Consumers observe technology values as well as predecessor's choices, and adopt technologies based on switching strategies that factor in expectations over future agents' behavior. We show that technologies cannot lock in by historical events. Instead technologies will alternatively be unique symmetric perfect bayesian equilibrium since agents choose both when and whether to join a network. 2 More recently, Burdzy, Frankel and Pauzner [4] , Frankel and Pauzner [11] and Frankel [12] study the conditions under which an equilibrium is selected for dynamic games with binary actions and strategic complementarities. Giannitsarou and Toxvaerd [14] provide similar results for recursive games and Levin [17] extends the main findings to overlapping generation games.
chosen through time, and we use the average time of adoption as a measure of technology permanence in the market.
Several interesting cases are compatible with our main result. The computer industry clearly does not comply with early leading technologies becoming dominant (see Gandal et al. [13] for further details). In the early 80's, CP/M, a highly adopted operating system, was orphaned both by users and developers at the advantage of DOS, an operating system that had been recently developed. 3 In this case the technology that had initially gained some market share lost its relevance over time. One reason for this is the heterogeneity of adopters: early buyers are usually highly skilled, while late buyers are less skilled and might go for a more user friendly platform. Another example that contradicts the idea of lock-in is the persistence in time of the two computer platforms Macintosh and PC (IBM-PC). These two platforms became important at the time the 16-bit microprocessor was invented, and have shared the market since then. Passing through several waves of technological advances none of the two managed to become dominant in the market. An explanation for this evidence is the idea that the marginal utility of technological improvements for consumers is not constant in every step of the technology evolution. Adner [1] argues that the value of technology improvements through time takes the form of an S-curve: agents have a very high willingness to pay for the first improvements, but this willingness becomes decreasing from a certain threshold on. Improvements in microprocessors' speed stand as a clear example of this. In the beginning microprocessors were very slow and any marginal increase in the speed was extremely valued by the consumers. However, as the microprocessors proved faster, speed increases became less important. If we think about two technologies whose values evolve through time as specified by Adner [1] , it is possible that at a certain point in time consumers have higher willingness to pay for one technology, and at another point in time they prefer the other technology. Stated differently, technologies' relative values oscillate through time. In the Macintosh/PC example, the permanence in the market of the two standards is justified by the oscillating preferences of the consumers for the technological improvements in the two platforms.
Alternatively to explaining the coexistence of alternative platforms, one can use our model to interpret the pattern of waves of new technologies. In this case the competition is between an old and a recently introduced technology. Consider for example the record industry, where the decline of vinyl albums over the years can be attributed to the advantages of CDs such as sound quality and durability. Worldwide retail sales of vinyl LPs fell by more than 80% between 1985 and 1992, from 730 to 126 millions of units. On the other hand CD sales totaled 1153 millions of units in 1992, which is roughly a twentyfold increase from the 61 millions sold in 1985 (see the UK Competition Commission report [26] ). Concluding that the times for the vinyl format are over might be tempting, albeit likely too hasty. For instance the ratio between LP and CD sales increased from 0.44% in 1992 to more than 2% at the end of 2000 in Japan, the second largest market for CDs. The renewed interest for vinyl LPs in recent years is mainly attributed to popularity among collectors as well as dance music fans. This pattern can therefore be represented as a taste shock to consumer preferences like in Macskasi [20] . The idea is that relative preferences towards different technologies could change over time and as a result consumers' tastes evolve in a stochastic fashion. 4 We have already discussed some examples that would support our analysis. As for the type of network externalities we refer to, one can distinguish direct from indirect (positive) network externalities. The former type refers to the increase in the quality of the product due to an increment in the number of users. The latter entails broader benefits from wider installed bases, such as higher probability of advances or availability of new components (see Liebowitz and Margolis [18] for a complete characterization). In our model we focus solely on the direct effects produced by a larger mass of adopters. We leave for future investigation the introduction of agents' preferences incorporating indirect effects as well.
Our results are also consistent with observations in Liebowitz and Margolis [18] , [19] , that question the empirical relevance of lock-in patterns in technology adoption, arguing that lock-ins are extremely unlikely to occur. According to these authors there is little evidence that an inferior technology could achieve such a strong market lead to lock in. The main idea is that network effects are important but insufficient to support an inferior technology. We present a different rationale for the absence of lock-ins. Agents incorporate successors' choices and face technologies with stochastic stand alone values. Given that these values are independent of the number of adopters, network externalities are not the only driving force behind technology adoption. A lead in terms of installed base is not enough to attract all consumers. This is because agents are concerned with the stand alone value granted by the technology upon purchase, as well as with the value provided in the subsequent period.
Even though lock-in does not emerge in our setup, path dependence in technology choices is still present. Once the model parameters are laid out, the technology adopted by the ancestor affects the current user's adoption decision. When this occurs the equilibrium path exhibits hysteresis. Moreover, the likelihood of observing hysteresis increases in the network benefit: the larger the latter, the higher the importance of predecessors' choices. We study as well the technology adoption path when a converting device is available and allows agents from different networks to interact, thus enhancing network benefits. The finding on the absence of lock-in holds in this case as well. The main insight is that converters contribute to mitigate hysteresis: agents have weaker incentives to coordinate their choices, and as a consequence technology adoption depends less on predecessors' decisions.
Since technologies do not lock in, a different measure of dominance should be studied in order to open the possibility to include firms' choices in future research. The first measure we propose is the limiting probability of technology adoption. This describes the likelihood that each technology is chosen in the long run, and provides a rough estimate of its expected demand schedule over long horizons. We show that technologies are more likely to be adopted in the long run if they 1) provide higher stand alone values, or 2) agents prefer bigger networks, or 3) they embed a converter device. In short run equilibrium a technology will be adopted for a certain number of consecutive periods, and then replaced. From the producer's point of view, it is therefore important to determine what is the expected time of adoption, our second measure for dominance. We find that the expected time of adoption decreases in the presence of converters due to the fact that compatible technologies reduce path dependence and one observes switching between technologies more often.
In what follows we propose a formalization for technology adoption within an OLG setup explicitly considering the effect of future actions, and using the methodology in Levin [17] in order to select the equilibrium that will effectively be played. This implies the introduction of a stochastic component on the payoffs. The objective is to lead agents to coordinate their "expectations" on a unique equilibrium. This paper contributes to two different lines of research. On one side it fills the mentioned gap in the technology adoption literature, and on the other it provides a further application of the theory of global games.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The sequential move game with incompatible technologies is described in section 2. Section 3 characterizes the unique equilibrium and analyses the impact of the underlying parameters on the equilibrium outcome. Partial converters are introduced in section 4. The long run behavior of our adoption game is described in section 5. Section 6 focuses on the robustness of the equilibrium outcome to alternative specifications. Finally section 7 concludes.
Theoretical model
Within a discrete time and infinite horizon setting we consider a sequence of users who are planning to adopt a technology. At each time n ∈ N, player n enters the game and chooses among two competing technologies A and B. Each player lives for two periods. We borrow the terminology from the OLG literature and refer to the young (resp. old) generation at time n as the n-th player (resp. the (n − 1)-th player). In the first period user n buys a single unit of one of the two technologies and commits to his choice in period n + 1. 5 Without loss of generality, we denote player n's action set as A n = {0, 1} where a n = 1 (resp. a n = 0) corresponds to technology A (resp. B). We restrict our analysis to unsponsored technologies 6 resulting in technologies supplied at a price equal to zero. Agents discount future payoffs via the discount factor β ∈ (0, 1).
Technology value
The technology value at time n is given by x n . Time n technology value can be thought of as player n's relative preference between the two technologies when no other agent shares the same base. Alternatively, if we regard technologies as evolving through time, x n measures the relative value of technologies' developments at time n. We model the evolution of technology values through time as a variable following a random walk with barriers −α and α, α > 0, i.e. x n = x n−1 + σε n where σ > 0. The innovation ε is characterized by the density g (ε):
where p ∈ (0, 1). Let S denote the state space for the process x. Without loss of generality we assume {0, α} ∈ S and letn denote the number of steps the process takes to move from 0 to α, i.e.n = α/σ. Therefore the (finite) state space S comprises 2n + 1 elements and is given by S = {−α, − (α − σ) , ..., −σ, 0, σ, ..., α}. The boundaries α and −α are partially reflecting. In other words, if the random walk is in state α at time n, the following period it can either go down to α − σ with probability q or stay at α with probability p = 1 − q. 7 The process for the technology value can thus be represented as follows:
Technology values are stochastic as in Choi [6] in order to capture the idea that the stand alone value at time n + 1 -a linear function of x n+1 as described in section 2.2.1 -will be revealed to players at the beginning of that period, such that x n+1 is a random variable from player n's standpoint at time n. As such we view the technology value as inherent to the technology itself, rather than being agent-specific. The step size σ > 0 in (1) can be thought of as a measure of (intertemporal) heterogeneity in technology valuation, and drives the randomness in players' payoff. As it has been mentioned in the Introduction, the literature on strategy and management provides an intuitive explanation for the stochastic technology values' assumption, known as the demand S-curve for technology improvements (see Adner [1] ). What happens if we have two technologies evolving at different paces? It is surely possible that at one point in time one technology is preferred to the other, and that this pattern changes with the evolution of the agents' willingness to pay. This can result in relative preferences for technologies fluctuating over time as specified by the random walk (1) .
Alternatively, one can also explain the correlation through time in technology values resorting to taste shocks in users' preferences like in Macskasi [20] . In this case each generation tastes' are evolving, as to say that the relative preferences for the young generation at time n might differ from the tastes of the same generation when old at time n + 1. Note however that at each point in time both the young and the old generations agree on the technology value. This argument leads again to think of technology values as time specific.
Individual preferences
As in Arthur [2] , Choi [6] , Farrell and Saloner [9] and Shy [25] , player's valuation of a technology reflects two components: the stand alone value and the network value. The former captures the benefit the user derives if no other player adopts the same technology, while the latter is the benefit from interacting with other users.
Stand alone value
The n−th period stand alone value depends on the contemporaneous technology value x n . After opting for one technology, generation n receives the stand alone value at period n and at period (n + 1) . The time n stand alone value is therefore a function of the current technology value x n and player n's chosen technology a n . Similarly player n's stand alone value at time n + 1 depends on a n and x n+1 .
The n−th generation stand alone value corresponding to the technology value x = {x n , x n+1 } is given by π s :
According to (2) , players' relative preference for technology A over B is increasing in the technology value through an affine function. 8 This formulation is fairly standard in the literature. Arthur [2] considers two (classes of) agents with the former (resp. the latter) displaying a natural preference for technology A (resp. technology B). His formalization for the stand alone value can be obtained from ours restricting x to take only two values, say x = {−1, 1}, with equal probabilities. The specification for π s in (2) is analogous to Farrell and Saloner [9] with the only difference that technology 8 Note that setting the barriers in (1) together with the payoff in (2) imply that the stand alone value belongs to the interval [0, 2α] ∈ < + . This normalization provides individuals with a (weakly) positive utility from purchasing one of the two techologies in the absence of network benefits.
values belong to the interval [−α, α] in our model rather than [0, 1]. Shy [25] considers a richer specification for the stand alone value, without restricting to affine functions of x n .
Network Value
Each user lives for two periods and at each time n there are two generations active in the market. Thus player n's network value depends on the action chosen by his immediate predecessor n − 1 and by his immediate successor n + 1. As such, both the installed base, i.e. the technology adopted by user n − 1, as well as the future base, i.e. the technology player n + 1 chooses in the following period, become relevant for player n's choice.
In line with much of the previous literature we consider the network value to be linear in the number of users of the same technology. Further we assume that the two technologies provide the same network benefit per unit of member in the base, ν > 0. 9 . For the time being we focus on incompatible technologies, while in section 4 we drop this assumption and consider different degrees of compatibility between competing technologies. If player n and n − 1 adopt the same technology, they receive a network benefit of ν. The same payoff is received if user n and n + 1 coordinate on the same technology. Generation n's per-period network payoff π ν is given by:
where a −n denotes the technology purchased by the other generation active in the market, i.e. a −n = a n−1 at time n and a −n = a n+1 at time n + 1.
Total Payoffs
Adding up the stand-alone component (2) and the network component (3) gives player n's overall utility u n = u (a n , a n−1 , a n+1 , x n , x n+1 ):
For the remainder of our analysis it is useful to rewrite player n's payoff in the compact way:
u n = [π s (a n , x n ) + βπ s (a n , x n+1 )] + π ν (a n , a n−1 ) + βπ ν (a n , a n+1 )
The terms in (4) capture respectively the lifetime stand alone value and the network component related to the installed base and to the (discounted) future base.
Timing and Strategies
At time n, agent n is aware of: 1) the current technology valuation x n and 2) the predecessor's choice a n−1 . Recall from section 2.1 that x n+1 is not revealed to agent n until period n + 1 is reached. Everything else is common knowledge. A strategy for generation n is thus a function s n (a n−1 , x n ) :
Player n chooses his action to maximize the expected payoff in (4) . Given that x n and a n−1 are known, and letting s n+1 (a n , x n+1 ) denote the strategy of player (n + 1), the n−th player solves the following:
From (5) it emerges that when choosing which technology to purchase player n keeps into account the effect of his action in determining the future size of the network, which in turn affects player's n + 1 compatibility payoff. As such our model belongs to the class of binary action coordination games with influence analyzed in Levin [17] . It is worth noting that the process (1) allows the technological valuation to be correlated through time, which turns out to be crucial in enabling player n to forecast the next generation's strategy after observing x n . Technology values are assumed to be independent through time in Arthur [2] , while the technology innovation -and thus the stand alone value-is given by a deterministic -rather than stochastic-process in Shy [25] . In the sequential move games of Arthur [2] and Shy [25] the intertemporal pattern of technology values does not play a relevant role, since users choose their action based on the installed base only. Unlike these works, we allow player n to receive network benefits from the (expected) future base via (5), and thus we explicitly bring in a role for predicting future technology values. Our specification (1) is closely related to Oyama [24] , which employs a random walk with reflecting barriers to describe the pattern of fundamentals within an OLG speculative attack model. If agents cannot benefit form large installed basis −that is there are no network externalities−, utility is simply given by the discounted sum of stand alone values (2). The maximization problem in (5) therefore resumes to:
Proposition 1 provides the equilibrium strategy for the technology adoption game with ν = 0. The Appendix contains all the proofs. Proposition 1. Let α > σ and definex ∈ [−α, α] as follows:
Then the equilibrium strategy for player n is given by:
We refer to the technology valuex in (6) as the pivotal point, that is the threshold above which the agent has a strict preference for technology A. For the symmetric random walk, i.e. p = 1/2 in (1), the pivotal point is zero since the best forecast for future technology values is x n . In this case agents do not expect x n+1 to deviate from the current technology value. As a consequence, if they prefer technology A to B at time n (this would occur when x n >x = 0), then they expect to keep the same ordering of the two technologies at time n + 1. From (6) the pivotal pointx decreases in p. An increase in p means that technology A is expected to provide higher stand alone payoffs relative to B in the future. This creates an incentive for player n to adopt technology A, thus resulting in lower values forx. Furthermorê x is decreasing in the discount factor for p > 1/2 and increasing otherwise. This follows from the fact that technology A is more valuable relative to B whenever p > 1/2. Finally, note that whenever the discount factor is close to zero, the future payoff becomes irrelevant (due to maximal discount of the future) and as a result the thresholdx tends to zero.
The model with network externalities
In this section we analyze the equilibrium strategies when ν > 0. In order to solve for the equilibrium in the sequential move game outlined in section 2 we introduce the following: Lemma 1. Consider the following condition on the model parameters:
Furthermore letx =x + ν/2 and x =x − ν. Under (7) the technology adoption game displays region dominance in that:
Recall from (2) that the maximal per-period stand alone value is given by 2α, while from (3) the per-period network benefit is ν. According to (7) there exist technology values for which the maximal (discounted) stand alone valuation (2α (1 + β)) offsets the (discounted) benefits from coordinating on a network, i.e. adopting the installed technology (ν) given that it will be chosen by the immediate successor (βν). Lemma 1 ensures that some individuals would choose a technology as a dominant action regardless of the network size: technology A is dominant whenever x n is above the critical valuex, whereas technology B is dominant if the technology value falls below x. Condition (7) guarantees that the valuesx and x lie in the state space S. In general, multiple equilibria would occur within the interval [x,x]. This region is symmetric aroundx, i.e. the pivotal point for dominant actions in the absence of network benefits. Note that the gapx − x does not depend on the probability of upward movements in (1) and depends positively on the network benefit. The former occurs because technologies emerge as dominant actions whenever the stand alone value is large enough to offset network benefits. An increase in p would make technology A more valuable via an increase in its stand alone value. As explained in the previous section this lowers the pivotal pointx, which would affect bothx and x in the same way. The fact thatx − x increases in ν stems from the fact that when individuals attach a large positive value to joining a network, a high stand alone component is needed in order to adopt technologies regardless of other users' choices. As a result bothx and x would move away fromx the larger is ν. Lemma 1 plays a key role in applying an iterated elimination argument, and thus solving for the unique equilibrium. Proposition 2. Under (7) the game admits a unique equilibrium in which for all n:
where the cut-off x (a n−1 ) is decreasing in a n−1 .
According to Proposition 2 switching strategies are played at equilibrium. Within the global game literature this is a common finding due to strategic complementarities in (dynamic) games. Player n has an incentive to move to higher actions as soon as the successor raises his strategy from s n+1 to s 0 n+1 > s n+1 . The cut-off points x (a n−1 ) specify the technology values at which user n is indifferent between the two technologies. These cut-offs depend on the predecessor's observed action as well as on the expected behavior of the immediate successor, and due to condition (7) they belong to the region [x,x]. From Proposition 2 it follows that x (0) > x (1) , so that when technology A is highly valuable relative to B -this occurs when a player observes a relatively high value for x n -it is going to be adopted regardless of the predecessor's choice. On the other hand when technology B is more valuable, player n is more likely to purchase technology A only if he observes his predecessor choosing A. The cut-off points are defined in the following: Corollary 1. Let the step size σ be sufficiently small according to:
Then the cut-off points in Proposition 2 are given by:
Unlike condition (7) , the inequality (8) does not play any role for the equilibrium uniqueness result. It guarantees that the game displays hysteresis, rather than jumping from one equilibrium to the other outside the region [x (1) , x (0)] every few periods.
Interpretation
Consider the time during which all types fall into one of the dominance regions, say x n >x. In this case technology network benefits are not strong enough to observe A-lover individuals choosing the competing tech-
The cut-off points (9a, 9b) have the following interpretation. When the technology value is below x (1), then technology B is chosen since network benefits arising from coordination on technology A are not enough to counterbalance its low (stand alone) value. Technology B is going to be adopted by all users until the technology value rises above x (0). When this occurs, in equilibrium all users choose technology A until its value relative to B falls again below x (1). The interval [x (1) , x (0)] generates hysteresis, since player n's choice depends on the predecessor's action (as well as the expectation of the successor's action) whenever x n falls into the hysteresis band, i.e. the gap x (0) − x (1) =σ. In other words, when x n ∈ (x (1) , x (0)) individual n's choice is determined by his predecessor's action, and equilibrium adoption is path dependent. Technology adoption would exhibit hysteresis as in Oyama's [24] speculative attack model. Whenσ is small the likelihood of hysteresis is reduced, i.e. the probability of simultaneously observing a technology value falling into the interval [x (1) , x (0)] and a user choosing based on the past history is small.
We can perform the following comparative statics over the hysteresis band: 1) it narrows with the discount rate β and 2) it widens with the network benefit ν. High values for β mean that the importance of the future base is high relative to the installed base. In such a situation individuals tend to disregard the predecessor's action and the switching points get closer to each other. On the other hand an increase in the network externality ν would increase the importance of the network component relative to the stand alone value in the individuals' expected utility, thus moving (9a, 9b) away fromx. 10 These effects are summarized in Figure 1 -Panel A. Figure  1 
Note from (9a, 9b) that when the technology value is expected to be constant through time, i.e. p = 1/2, the cut-off points are symmetric around zero. Further the cut-offs collapse to zero as the network externality dies out; in this case technologies are chosen in equilibrium depending on their stand alone value only. Similarly, when the technology value is expected to move away from its current value -because either p > 1/2 or p < 1/2-, the cut-off points converge to the pivotal point as ν goes to zero, i.e. lim ν→0 x (0) = lim ν→0 x (1) =x.
Finally, if p increases, the process for technology values is expected to move upwards with a higher probability as time goes by, so that there is a higher probability that the successor turns out to adopt technology A. As discussed in the previous section, this lowers the minimum level of stand alone value required for the current player to choose technology A. An increase in p thus decreases both the cut-off points by the same amount 11 (a similar argument applies to a decrease in p).
Introducing Converters

Individual payoffs
We now consider the effect of converters enabling imperfect compatibility between technologies A and B. As in section 2 we consider perfect competition, implying a null price for the converter. Let r ∈ (0, 1) denote the compatibility of technology A with B (s is defined similarly). The stand alone component is not influenced by the existence of converters. Converters have an effect on the utility derived from networks, in that they allow agents to profit from the network even if no one else has chosen the same 10 It is possible that cut-offs turn out to be negative. This is not surprising, given that technology values are defined on the interval [−α, α]; however the stand alone valuation is always nonnegative due to (2) (see also footnote 8).
11 Since x (1) = x (0) −σ andσ is independent of p, using (9a)
technology. Consider for example player n choosing technology A while both the previous and the following generations opt for technology B. Compatibility results in a payoff of νr (1 + β) contrasting with a null network benefit in the absence of converters. Similarly player n receives νs (1 + β) if he adopts technology B and both agent n − 1 and n + 1 choose A. Let u * n = u * (a n , a n−1 , a n+1 , x n , x n+1 ) denote the individual payoff with compatibility.
Using the payoffs defined in (2, 3) for the incompatibility case gives:
− νr (a n−1 + βa n+1 ) if a n = 1 u (0, .) + νs (a n−1 + βa n+1 ) if a n = 0 or equivalently:
Note that when both the compatibility levels are equal to zero one gets the u * n = u n and the previous results with incompatible technologies would follow.
Equilibrium and interpretation
The equilibrium in the absence of external benefits (ν = 0, see Proposition 1) does not change with the introduction of converters as they act as network enhancers only.
On the contrary, the equilibrium with ν > 0 is different from the incompatibility case and is characterized in the following: Proposition 3. Let the parameters satisfy the restriction (7). Then the technology adoption game display dominance regions. Technology A is dominant if x n ≥x * =x + ν (1 − r) /2 and technology B is dominant if x n < x * =x − ν (1 − s) /2. The game admits a unique equilibrium in which for all n:
where the cut-off x * (a n−1 ) is decreasing in a n−1 . Furthermore let the step size σ be sufficiently small according to:
Then the cut-off points are given by:
In the presence of converters the dominance regions are affected by the probability of upward movements p and the network benefit ν along the same lines as the incompatibility case. An increase in ν would move x * andx * towards the barriers α and −α, thus shrinking the dominance regions. When technologies provide substantial network benefits, it takes higher stand alone values (and therefore higher technology values) in order to make individual opt without considering network externalities. Note that converters act in the opposite direction, that is an increase in either r or s (or both) would reduce the dominance regions. High values for r provide an individual opting for A with network payoffs even if other players choose B, thus making technology A more appealing and widening the region [x * , α]. As it emerges comparing the dominance regions in the compatibility case with Lemma 1, the presence of converters shrinks the interval in which no action is dominant, i.e. [x * ,x * ] ⊂ [x,x]. The reason behind this is that when technologies are compatible the gains from coordinating (i.e. three generations choosing the same technology) are reduced, since player n profits from some network externalities even if he chooses a different technology relative to players n−1 and n+1. The same argument implies that the hysteresis band narrows with compatible technologies. In fact (8, 11) yield:
such thatσ * <σ. Given the cut-off points in (12, 13), we get the following comparative statics results.
1. when network payoffs are negligible, individuals switch around the pivotal point of the stand alone valuation. As converters act only through the network benefit, when the latter vanishes the equilibrium strategies tend to coincide with the equilibrium strategies in the absence of network externalities;
2. an increase in the discount rate β reduces the hysteresis band along the same lines as in section 3.2. However, in the presence of converters this gap reduces less than in the case without converters. 12 This is because agents derive utility from the installed base even if they buy a technology that has not been chosen by the previous generation;
3. converters affect cut-off points in an asymmetric fashion, since higher values of s increase both x * (0) and x * (1) while an increase in r would lower both the switching points. This finding has the following interpretation. Assume that, given the predecessor's choice, player n is indifferent between the two technologies. Other things equal an increase in s makes technology B more attractive since user n achieves higher gains from compatibility with the competing technology A. As a consequence it would take a higher x n , i.e. an individual that is relatively more prone to purchase technology A, to restore indifference. A similar reasoning would hold with respect to an increase in r. Despite this asymmetry note that an increase in either of the compatibility parameters would narrow the hysteresis bandσ * . Partial converters bring in network benefits that can be reaped when other players purchase the competing technology. A higher level of the oneway compatibility s has a higher impact in the utility function when the predecessor chose A than when he chose B. In order to restore indifference, the cut-off for a n−1 = 1 increase more than the cut-off for a n−1 = 0, thus narrowing the hysteresis band. A similar argument applies to changes in r.
The main point here is that, other things equal, converters decrease network benefits from coordination on the same technology and dominance regions widen. Moreover, with symmetric converters (s = r) the cutoff points x * (0) and x * (1) are symmetric around zero as in the incompatibility case, and [x * (0) , x * (1)] ⊂ [x (0) , x (1)]. As a result hysteresis is less likely to occur with partial converters (contrast Panel A.1 with Panel B.1 in Figure  1 ). On the other hand asymmetric converters would drive individual choices towards the more compatible technology. In order to see this, compare Panel B.2 and B.3 in Figure 1 . Given a sample path for (1) and other exogenous parameters, the case of symmetric converters r = s = 0.2 is considered in Panel B.1, while asymmetric converters r = 0.6 and s = 0.2 (resp. r = 0.2 12 From (14) one has:
Therefore ∂σ * /∂β < 0 since from (p, r, s) ∈ (0, 1) 3 it follows that r (2 − p) + s (1 + p) < 3. 5 Long run behavior and the expected time of adoption
Technology lock-in and limiting behavior
We investigate lock-in effects in our OLG setup where individuals explicitly take into account the actions of future generations when choosing between two competing technologies. In the existing literature (see Arthur [2] ) one technology emerges as dominant as time goes by. In other words there exists a time after which all players opt for the same technology. In our setup, due to the stochastic nature of the individual types, the emerging of a technology as dominant is related to: 1) the likelihood of the stochastic process for x n hitting the barriers x,x, x (0) and x (1) (as well as their counterpart with converters) and 2) the impact of the underlying parameters on the mentioned barriers. As for the latter point, we have provided several comparative statics results in sections 3 and 4. The long run characterization of our adoption game is thus captured by the limiting behavior of the technology process (1) like in Kandori et al. [15] . Technology A locks in if and only if x n is always above x (0) for large n (similarly technology B locks in if and only if x n is below x (1)). More formally, let the adoption probabilities of the two technologies be defined as π A = lim n→∞ Pr (x n ≥ x (0)) and π B = lim n→∞ Pr (x n ≤ x (1)). Adoption probabilities with compatible technologies are defined similarly, i.e. with respect to the relevant cut-offs x * (0) and x * (1), and denoted by π * A and π * B . Then technologies lock in if and only if either π A = 1 or π B = 1 (lock-ins with compatible technologies are defined similarly). The idea behind Proposition 4 is that the process (1) hits any barrier with positive probability, regardless of the uncertainty about future values σ. As a consequence, no technology can emerge as dominant in the long run, and lock-ins can occur only temporarily.
We now consider the interplay between the parameters in our game and the long run probabilities of adopting each technology. This point is clearly related to the impact of initial parameters on the cut-offs (see sections 3 and 4), since changes in the cut-offs affect the probabilities of adoption π A and π B . In what follows we analyze separately the two cases p = 1/2 and p 6 = 1/2. The above properties follow from the fact that with p = 1/2 the long run probabilities for the process (1) are all equal across states. In particular note from v) that converters increase the adoption probabilities whenever the ratio s/r belongs to the above interval. At a first glance this might seem to be in sharp contrast with findings in Arthur [2] . However note that in Arthur [2] consumers receive payoffs (both stand alone and network benefits) only upon purchase. This would correspond β = 0 in our setup, such that property v implies that converters increase the probability of adoption, alike Arthur [2] .
Corollary 3. For p 6 = 1/2: i) π A and π B weakly decrease with ν; ii) π A weakly increases with p (resp. π B decreases with p). With compatible technologies: iii) π * A weakly increases with p (resp. π * B weakly decreases with p) iv) π * A weakly increases in r and weakly decreases in s (resp. π * B weakly increases in s and weakly decreases in r); v ) π * A > π A and π * B > π B if and only if s/r ∈ µ β (1 − p) , 1 βp ¶ When p 6 = 1/2 one loses the symmetry between the cut-offs around zero, which is responsible for the two different adoption probabilities with incompatible technologies. Furthermore note that an increase in p increases the likelihood of adopting technology A. This is intuitive since higher values for p mean that technology A is more valuable, in that it provides higher stand alone values. Similarly to Corollary 2, an increase in compatibility level r makes technology A more valuable, and thus increases the probability it becomes dominant in the long run. Finally a bound on the conversion ratio s/r is needed in order to observe converters increasing the adoption probabilities.
Expected time of adoption
We now consider the length of time the random walk (1) takes to move from one state to the other. The aim here is to determine the expected time to observe individuals switching from one technology to the other. Consider incompatible technologies and assume that at time n the technology value is immediately below x (1). We know from Proposition 2 that player n would adopt technology B. At n + 1 the technology value can go further below or start drifting upwards towards x (0). In both cases players n + 1 chooses technology B. The same would repeat for the following players until x passes through x (0). From now onwards it is technology A to be chosen until x crosses x (1) and so on. Given that x n is immediately below x (1) we define by m B the expected number of adopters of technology B. m B is therefore related to the average number of periods the random walk (1) takes to move from x (1) to x (0). Similarly m A is the expected number of agents choosing technology A given that the process x is immediately above x (0) , and corresponds to the average time the random process (1) takes to exit the hysteresis band [x (1) , x (0)] after entering from x (0). Knowledge of m A and m B is useful to determine how often we are likely to observe adopters switching from one technology to the other. With convertible technologies m * A and m * B are defined along the same lines and have a similar interpretation. Formulas to compute m A and m B (and their counterpart with compatibility) are given in the Appendix. One might be interested in determining how compatible technologies affect the average time of adoption. For a given set of parameters (p, σ, α, β, ν) and convertibility values (r, s) we say that compatible technologies decrease the likelihood of switching -or equivalently increase path dependence-whenever m * A > m A and m * B > m B .
Proposition 5. The introduction of symmetric converters reduces path dependence. More generally converters reduce path dependence whenever
This finding follows from the fact that converters reduce the hysteresis band, which in turn implies that the expected adoption time for both technologies cannot increase. This will be relevant in an extended version of our model with sponsored technologies and firms setting technology prices based on the expected demand schedule.
Discussion
We now briefly discuss the impact of alternative assumptions on our equilibrium outcomes. First of all equilibrium uniqueness is preserved under a generalization of the utility function (5) . More specifically, linearity is not needed in order to observe the conditions required in Levin [17] and presented in the Appendix (see assumptions A.1.1, A.1.2, A.3.1, A.3.2 and A.4). A different specification of the payoffs would imply different equilibrium cut-off points.
Second, the random walk specification (1) is not necessary to select a unique equilibrium. We could have used a different cumulative distribution function for the innovation ε -including for instance a continuous distribution with bounded support-as well as a random walk without barriers for (1). We choose a binary distribution for the technology innovation for its simplicity and impose elastic barriers for the technology valuation in order to have bounded stand alone values like in the previous literature.
Third, an important feature that must be imposed on the game is that it displays dominance regions, such that one can apply an iterative dominance argument and select a unique equilibrium. This means that payoffs should be specified in such a way that for some technology values the actions chosen by other players (via the installed and future base), play no role in determining player n's choice. The model in Arthur [2] does not belong to this class: it is not true for all n that one action is optimal no matter the technology value and the history. This happens because the stand alone value is bounded but the network value is unbounded and increasing in the actions of all the predecessors.
Finally, the conclusion that lock-in does not occur is robust to more general stochastic processes for the technology valuation. For example a random walk with normal increments hits any barrier with probability one and therefore there is always a point for which it is optimal for the agent not to mimic the choice of the predecessor. If nevertheless, the random walk is finite, the conditions given in Proposition 3 are sufficient to obtain positive probability of visiting all the states as time goes by.
Conclusion
The objective of this paper is to analyze the impact of forward looking agents on technology choices. The existing literature does not encompass users getting utility from the purchased technology over their whole life time. Due to this assumption, agents take into consideration the installed base only, but do not form expectations of the future base. In his appendix Arthur (see [2] , page 129) introduces the possibility of forward looking behavior. Agents get a fixed payoff in case the technology they choose locks in. In this extended version, lock-in is a rational expectations equilibrium (or equivalently technology lock-in is self-fulfilling). However, his discussion is based on the assumption that one technology locks in. In his specification agents do not receive any network benefit over the time period, in which no technology emerges as dominant.
Our aim is to verify whether technologies can endogenously lock in within a model where agents receive benefits -not necessarily stemming from one technology locking in-during their whole life-time. For that we move to an overlapping generations setup similar to the one used in Shy [25] : at time n, agents are born and live for two periods. Once again, in this model it is not considered that agents get some utility from participating in the network when they are old and thus the choices of the successors do not affect the decision of agent n.
Our OLG model allows us to consider agents that: 1) receive benefits in all periods of their permanence in a network and 2) take them into account when choosing the technology in the first period. By using the OLG model we rule out the accumulation of the installed base present in Arthur [2] , since at most we can have an installed base of one generation. We show that lock-in does not occur and the adoption path exhibits hysteresis. In equilibrium one technology is chosen for some time, and then the competing one emerges temporarily as dominant.
Further investigation could be done including agents living for more than two periods. In this case we would not expect the qualitative conclusions of our model to change. However this step could make the setup more realistic, in that at each point in time more than two generations are active in the market. Another promising direction is to introduce sponsored technologies produced by competing firms. 
Appendix
Proof (Proposition 1). In the absence of network benefits, i.e. ν = 0, agents are indifferent between technology A (a n = 1) and technology B (a n = 0) when the technology valuationx solves: 14
Plugging (2) in the latter gives:
In the following we summarize the assumptions in Levin [17] ensuring equilibrium uniqueness in a binary coordination game with influence 15 . Let the functions ∆ n = ∆ (a n−1 , a n+1 , x n , x n+1 ) (resp. Λ = Λ n (a n , a n−1 , x n , x n+1 )) denote the difference in individual n's payoff when the individual n switches to technology A (resp. the player n + 1 switches to technology A) from technology B:
∆ n ≡ u (1, a n−1 , a n+1 , x n , x n+1 ) − u (0, a n−1 , a n+1 , x n , x n+1 ) (15) Λ n ≡ u (a n , a n−1 , 1, x n , x n+1 ) − u (a n , a n−1 , 0, x n , x n+1 )
Consider the following assumptions: A1: There exists x,x ∈ S such that for all n, if x n < x then a n = 0 is dominant for user n, and if x n >x then a n = 1 is dominant for user n A2.1: For all n, x n , ∆ n is increasing in a n−1 and a n+1 A2.2: For all n, x n , and for some M a > 0:
For all n, a n−1 , ∆ n is increasing in x n and x n+1 14 Since technologies provide players with the stand alone value only, the predecessor's action an−1 is redundant in solving the maximization problem 5 . 15 In what follows we omit the assumption regarding payoff concavity and individual types' uncertainty (see Levin [17] , pages 4-5), since they are trivially satisfied in a binary game with xt following a random walk like in (1) . Levin [17] discusses more general properties on the payoff structure and the stochastic process for x i leading to a unique equilibrium.
A3.2:
For all x 0 n , x n ∈ [x,x] with x 0 n > x n and for some M x > 0
A4: For all n, Λ (a n , a n−1 , x n , x n+1 ) = Λ (a n ) is independent of a n−1 , x n and x n+1 ; furthermore Λ (1) ≥ 0 ≥ Λ (0)
Consider a technology value x n ∈ [x,x] and define δ (x n ) as the number of steps the random walk (1) takes to move from x n up tox, i.e.
We now weaken the positive shifting assumption (see Levin [17] , page 5) to the following: A5: (local positive shifting) For all n such that x n ∈ [x,x] an increase in x n leads to larger stochastic increase in the distribution for x n+1 , i.e. for all δ ∈ {0, 1, ..., δ (x n )} X n+1 |x n + δ first order stochastically dominates X n+1 |x n Proof (Lemma 1). This is equivalent to showing that A1 holds. Using the payoffs in (4) one gets the following expression for (15):
Now let∆ n and ∆ n denote respectively the value of ∆ n when both the users n − 1 and n + 1 choose the low and high action respectively, i.e. ∆ n = ∆ (0, 0, x n , x n+1 ) and ∆ n = ∆ (1, 1, x n , x n+1 ). From (17) one has:
We now solve for the technology values making individuals indifferent between the two technologies. Letx (resp. x) be the type that makes the individual n indifferent between choosing one of the two technologies when both the predecessor and the successor coordinate on technology A (resp. B), i.e. E ¡∆ n |x n =x ¢ = 0 (resp. E (∆ n |x n = x) = 0). Recall that E (x n+1 |x n ) = x n + σ (2p − 1) for |x n | < α. Using the above expressions for ∆ n and ∆ n one getsx =x + ν/2 and x =x − ν/2. Sincex > x one needs to check that α > max {x, −x} forx and x to belong to (−α, α). This is equivalent to require that ν/2 < min {α −x, α +x}. Substituting for (6) gives condition (7). ¥ Proof (Proposition 2). We check that assumptions A2.1-A5 are satisfied by our technology adoption game described in section (2).
Since ν > 0 and β ∈ (0, 1) , one has from (17) that ∆ n increasing in a n−1 and a n+1 (A2.1). Further ∆ (a n−1 , 1, x n , x n+1 )−∆ (a n−1 , 0, x n , x n+1 ) = 2νβ > 0 which satisfies A2.2.
From equation (17) it is obvious that ∆ n is increasing in the technology values x n and x n+1 (assumption A3.1). For x 0 n , x n ∈ [x, x] with x 0 n > x n one has:
¢ is bounded above by 2σ, then condition A3.3 obtains with M −x = 4βσ.
Using the payoffs in (4) one gets the following expression for (16):
From (18) Λ n is independent of the previous generation action as well as the technology values, i.e. Λ (a n , a n−1 , x n , x n+1 ) = Λ (a n ) ; further Λ (1) = βν > 0 and Λ (0) = −βν < 0 (assumption A4). Eventually A5 holds since the interval [x,x] belongs to (−α, α) thanks to assumption (7) in Lemma 1. The proof of equilibrium uniqueness follows directly from Levin [17] .¥ Proof (Corollary 1). In order to determine the cut-off points let the function D n = D (a n−1 , x) be defined as:
where E x (·) denotes the expectation operator conditional on x n = x. The function D n (·) gives the payoff difference for player n -facing the technology value x n = x-between choosing 1 or 0 when the future generation is expected to play the equilibrium strategy specified above in Proposition 2. Using the definitions in (15, 16) and Λ (1) = −Λ (0), one can rewrite D n as follows:
he cut-off points x (0) and x (1) are found as solutions to D (1, x (1)) = 0 and D (0, x (0)) = 0. These points are uniquely determined given that the function D n is strictly increasing in x n in the region [x, x]. From Proposition 2 we have x (0) − x (1) > 0. Further, since from assumption (8) the noise in the stochastic payoff is relatively small, we conjecture that
σ´= 0. Therefore x (1) and x (0) solve:
Using (17) and Λ (0) = −βν in these equations give the cut-offs (9a, 9b).
2(1+β) =σ such that for σ <σ (see condition (8)) the conjecture x (0) − x (1) > σ is verified. Finally the comparative statics results on the hysteresis band follows from the derivatives of the gap x (0) − x (1) with respect to β and ν, that are given respectively by ∂σ/∂β = −3ν/
. The incremental payoffs for the compatibility case ∆ * n and Λ * n are defined along the same lines of (15, 16) . Using (10) they can be written in terms of their counterpart under incompatibility:
The dominance regions (see A1 above) can be determined as before since:
which yieldx * =x + ν (1 − r) /2 and x * =x − ν (1 − s) /2. Forx * and x * to belong to the state space S one needsx * < α and x * > −α sincē x * > x * . Note however thatx * <x and x * > x such that condition (7) is sufficient to guarantee that the adoption game displays dominance regions with compatible technologies. From (20) ∆ * n is increasing in a n−1 and a n+1 since ∆ n increasing in both a n−1 and a n+1 and r+s < 2 (assumption A2.1). Assumption A2.2 holds with M a = βν (2 − (s + r)) > 0. Further ∆ * n is increasing in x n and x n+1 (assumption A3.1) since ∆ * n depends linearly on ∆ n , and the latter is increasing in x n and x n+1 . Assumptions A3.2 and A3.3 hold with M x = 2 (1 + β) > 0 and M −x = 4ασ. Independency of Λ * n from predecessor's action and technology values (assumption A4) follows from independency of Λ n on the same variables and the expression for Λ * n in (21). Furthermore from (21) one has Λ * (1) = βν (1 − r) > 0 and Λ * (0) = −βν (1 − s) < 0. Local positive shifting (assumption A5) obviously holds (see also footnote 15). Therefore the necessary assumptions for equilibrium existence and uniqueness as stated in Levin [17] still hold after the introduction of converters.
Note that with converters the function D (·) in (19) is given by:
The cut-off points result from the solution to the system:
Once again we assume that the step size σ is small such that
σ´= 0. From (22) the cut-offs solve:
Using (20, 21) in these equations give the cut-offs in Proposition 3. Eventually from (12, 13) the difference x * (0) − x * (1) definesσ * such that under condition (11) the conjecture σ < x * (0) − x * (1) is verified.¥
Proof (Proposition 4)
. In what follows s i ∈ S denotes the i-th state, where the subscript i is an integer between 0 and 2n, i.e. s 0 = −α, ..., sn = 0, ..., s 2n = α. We apply results for Markov chains to the random walk (1).
The one-step transition matrix is given by:
with p + q = 1. Given that at time n the Markov chain is in state s i , P ij gives the probability that the Markov chain moves to state s j next period, i.e. P ij = Pr (x n+1 = s j |x n = s i ) for n ∈ N . The Markov chain described by (23) is irreducible, aperiodic and regular. It follows that the n-step ahead matrix P n converges as n → ∞ to a positive matrix Π = 1 > π (Çinlar [7] , Corollary 2.11). 16 The probability vector π is the unique solution to:
Since π j > 0, ∀j, each element in the limiting matrix Π is strictly positive. This means that every state can occur with a positive probability as n → ∞ and as a consequence technology lock-ins are ruled out in our game. This result is not affected by the compatibility between the two technologies, since the stationary distribution π is driven by the random process (1) only. ¥ 16 In what follows boldface characters denote row vectors; for example 1 is the 1×(2n + 1) unity vector. π j is the probability to reach state s j as time goes to infinite, i.e. π j = limn→∞ P (n) ij .
Proof (Corollary 2 and 3) . First of all we proceed in determining the probability vector π. Using the transition matrix (23) the constraints in (24a, 24b) become 17 :
π 0 q + π 1 q = π 0 π 0 p + π 2 q = π 1 π i−1 p + π i+1 q = π i , i = 2, ..., 2n − 2 π 2n−2 p + π 2n p = π 2n P 2n i=0 π i = 1
Letting ρ = p q the above system may be rewritten as:
By recursive substitution 18 one has π i = π 1 ρ i−1 = π 0 ρ i for i = 2, ..., 2n − 1, and π 2n = π 1 ρ 2n−1 = π 0 ρ 2n such that P 2n i=0 π i = π 0 P 2n i=0 ρ i . Thus: 
and the stationary distribution π is given by (26, 25a − 25c).
Recall that by construction, for a given step size σ, the barriers (α, −α) coincide with admissible states for the random walk process (s 2n , s 0 ). On the other hand this might not occur for the cut-off points x (0) and x (1). Before determining the adoption probabilities, one has to determine the states for the random walk process in (1) corresponding to the cut-offs. We therefore consider s n 0 as the nearest state to x (0) , and s n 1 as the nearest state to x (1), as follows: n 0 = {min n ∈ (0, 2n) : s n 0 +1 > x (0)} (27) n 1 = {max n ∈ (0, 2n) : s n 1 −1 < x (1)} (28) 17 Note that for the vector π to be uniquely determined as a solution for (24a, 24b) one equation in the system (24a) is redundant (or equivalently, the determinant of (I − P ) needs to be null). Thus we drop the (2n − 1)-th equation in (24a).
18 Note that whenn = 1, i.e. the state space for x is S = {−α, 0, α}, equations (25b) are not defined. The stationary distribution is defined by equations (25a, 25c, 25d) only.
It follows that the adoption probabilities are π A = P 2n k=n 0 π k and π B = P n 1 k=0 π k , or equivalently (adoption probabilities with compatible technologies are defined similarly, considering n * 0 and n * 1 instead of n 0 and n 1 ):
Case 1 (p = 1/2). For p = 1/2 one has ρ = 1 and π 0 = (2n + 1) 
¢ Taking the derivative with respect to n 0 and n 1 yields:
Therefore (i) follows from the above derivatives and the fact that ∂x (0) ∂ν > 0 > ∂x (1) ∂ν . Similarly, an increase in p causes both the cut-offs to decrease, yielding property (ii). An analogous argument applies to the cutoffs x * (0) and x * (1), yielding properties (iii) and (iv ). Finally for s/r ∈ µ β (1 − p) , 1 βp ¶ , the cut-offs with compatible technologies are within the interval [x (1) , x (0)] , and (v ) obtains. Note that the interval for s/r is always non-empty since 1 βp is strictly bigger than β (1 − p) for all (β, p) ∈ (0, 1) × (0, 1).
Proof (Proposition 5). For each state s j let τ j be the (function giving the) number of times that the process is in state s j . The expected first passage time from state s i to state s j is given by m ij = E i (τ j ). For the Markov chain (23) the matrix M = hm ij > 0i is given by (see Kemeny and Snell [16] , chapter VII): 
